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Summary
The use of economic sanctions to stem weapons proliferation acquired a new
dimension in the 1990s.  While earlier legislation required the cutoff of foreign aid
to countries engaged in specified nuclear proliferation activities and mentioned other
sanctions as a possible mechanism for bringing countries into compliance with goals
of treaties or international agreements, it was not until 1990 that Congress enacted
explicit guidelines for trade sanctions related to missile proliferation.  In that year a
requirement for the President to impose sanctions against U.S. persons or foreign
persons engaging in trade of items or technology listed in the Missile Technology
Control Regime Annex (MTCR Annex) was added to the Arms Export Control Act
and to the Export Administration Act of 1979.  Subsequently, Congress legislated
economic sanctions against countries that contribute to the proliferation of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons in a broad array of laws.
This report offers a listing and brief description of legal provisions that require
or authorize the imposition of some form of economic sanction against countries,
companies, or persons who violate U.S. nonproliferation norms.  For each provision,
information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their duration,
what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing sanctions, and
what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions.
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2 The International Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
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authorized the President to enter into international discussions, including the imposition of
sanctions against those who abrogate or violate these international agreements.
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Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile
Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current
Law
The use of economic sanctions to stem weapons proliferation acquired a new
dimension in the 1990s.1  While earlier legislation required the cutoff of foreign aid
to countries engaged in specified nuclear proliferation activities and mentioned other
sanctions as a possible mechanism for bringing countries into compliance with goals
of treaties or international agreements,2 it was not until 1990 that Congress enacted
explicit guidelines for trade sanctions related to missile proliferation.  In that year a
requirement for the President to impose sanctions against U.S. persons or foreign
persons engaging in trade of items or technology listed in the Missile Technology
Control Regime Annex (MTCR Annex) was added to the Arms Export Control Act
and to the Export Administration Act of 1979.  Subsequently, Congress legislated
economic sanctions against countries that contribute to the proliferation of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons in a broad array of laws.
This report offers an alphabetic listing and brief description of legal provisions
that require or authorize the imposition of some form of economic sanction against
countries, companies, or persons who violate U.S. nonproliferation norms.3  For each
provision, information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their
duration, what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing
sanctions, and what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions.
Of the several legislative proposals before the 107th Congress that pertain to or
have some implication for the control of weapons of mass destruction, the following
bills relate to nonproliferation and have implications for the use of sanctions in
foreign policy or national security matters:
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4 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2000, vol. II, page 880.
H.R. 1646 House passed version: Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 [May 16, 2001]
– Sec. 701 amends Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (reporting
requirements and technical changes)
– Sec. 702 amends North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999
(expansion of applicability)
– Title IX, Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 2001
     – Sec. 902 withholds U.S. voluntary contribution to the International
Atomic Energy Agency for work in Iran (amending sec. 307 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961)
     – Sec. 903 requires U.S. representatives to the IAEA to oppose any
IAEA efforts in Iran that are contrary to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation or
nuclear safety goals.
Senate-passed version: Security Assistance Act of 2002 [May 1,
2002]
– Sec. 205 amends Arms Export Control Act at sec. 40(d) to make
restrictive language applicable also to those engaged in transferring
chemical, biological, and radiological agents (current language pertains
to the transfer of nuclear explosive devices and nuclear material).
– Sec. 321 makes the availability of programs and funding under the
proposed “Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act
of 2001” conditional on Russia’s stemming the flow of sensitive goods
and technology related to weapons of mass destruction (or the means to
deliver WMD) to countries found by the United States to be supporters
of international terrorism. 
Current status: Senate appointed conferees, May 1, 2002.
H.R. 3836 Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act of
2001.
– Same as title III of Senate-passed Security Assistance Act of 2002,
described above.
Current status: referred to House Committee on International
Relations, March 4, 2002.  
Selected Current Law: Sanctions Provisions
18 U.S.C. (relating to criminal procedure)4
18 U.S.C. 229-229F (part I, chapter 11) makes it generally unlawful for a
person knowingly “(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any
chemical weapon; or (2) to assist, induce, in any way, any person to violate paragraph
(1), or to attempt or conspire to violate paragraph (1).”  The sections establish
criminal and civil penalties, and terms of criminal forfeiture.
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5 Public Law 90-629; approved October 22, 1968; 22 U.S.C. 2751 and following. 
Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2001, vol. I-A, p. 367.
Sec. 201 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
(Division I of Public Law 105-277; approved October 21, 1998) enacted these
sections to bring the criminal and civil penalties section of United States Code into
conformity with the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  Sec. 211
of that Act, furthermore, authorized the President to suspend or revoke export
privileges of anyone found in violation of 18 U.S.C. 229.
18 U.S.C. 2332a makes it an offense to use, threaten to use, attempt or conspire
to use certain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against a national of the United
States or within the United States.  Weapons of mass destruction include a range of
destructive devices, defined in 18 U.S.C. 921, and “any biological agent, toxin, or
vector.”   One found to have used a WMD for such use “shall be imprisoned for any
term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished by death or imprisoned
for any term of years of for life.”
Sec. 60023(a) of Public Law 103-322 (108 Stat. 1980) added sec. 2332a.  The
section was substantially reworked by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; approved April 24, 1996).  The Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Division I of Public Law 105-277;
approved October 21, 1998) exempted chemical weapons from application of this
section of 18 U.S.C., and in its place enacted chapter 11B of part I of 18 U.S.C.
(secs, 229 through 229F, above) to establish criminal and civil penalties in
conformity with the Chemical Weapons Convention.  The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188;
approved June 12, 2002) made technical changes.
Arms Export Control Act5
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, authorizes U.S.
government military sales, loans, leases, and financing, and licensing of commercial
arms sales to other countries.  The AECA coordinates such actions with other foreign
policy considerations, including nonproliferation, and determines eligibility of
recipients for military exports, sales, leases, loans, and financing.
Section 3(f) (Eligibility; 22 U.S.C. 2753(f)) prohibits U.S. military sales or
leases to any country that the President determines is in material breach of binding
commitments to the United States under international treaties or agreements
regarding nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices and unsafeguarded special
nuclear material.  
Subsec. (f) was added by sec. 822(a)(1) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention
Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994
and 1995; Public Law 103-236; approved April 30, 1994).
Section 38 (Control of Arms Exports and Imports; 22 U.S.C. 2778)
authorizes the President to control the import and export of defense articles and
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Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 07-115; 115 Stat. 2155).
services, to provide foreign policy guidelines to U.S. importers/exporters, and to
promulgate the United States Munitions List constituting what defense articles and
services are regulated.  Section 38(c) establishes that any person who willfully
violates any provision of the section (or of section 39 relating to the reporting of fees,
contributions, gifts, and commissions paid by those involved in commercial sales of
defense articles or services) may be fined not more than $1 million, imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both.  Section 38(e) gives the Secretary of State the authority
to assess civil penalties and initiate civil actions against violators; any civil penalty
for violations under this section is capped at $500,000.  Section 38(j) authorizes the
President to exempt a foreign country from licensing requirements under the AECA
when that country commits to a binding bilateral agreement with the United States
to establish export controls on a par with export controls in U.S. law and regulations.
Section 38 was added by sec. 212(a)(1) of the International Security Assistance
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329; approved June 30, 1976).
Subsec. (c) was added by the 1976 amendment; the fine and imprisonment terms
were amended, however, by sec. 119(a) of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83; approved August 8,
1985).  Formerly, fine was “not more than $100,000,” and period of imprisonment
was not more than two years.  Subsec. (e) was added by the 1976 amendment.  Sec.
119(b) of Public Law 99-83, in 1985, however, added the language that caps civil
penalties, and sec. 1303 of the Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Security
Assistance Act of 1999 (division B of the Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY 2000-2001; H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in Public Law
106-113), gave civil action authority to the Secretary of State.  Previously the section
referred to such authority in the Export Administration Act, which resides with the
Secretary of Commerce and was capped in that Act at $100,000.  Sec. 102(a)  of the
Security Assistance Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-280; approved October 6, 2000)
added subsec. (j).
Section 40 (Transactions With Countries Supporting Acts of International
Terrorism; 22 U.S.C. 2780) prohibits exporting or otherwise providing munitions,
providing financial assistance to facilitate transfer of munitions, granting eligibility
status for such transfers, issuing licenses for such transfers, or otherwise facilitating
the acquisition of munitions to a country the government of which “has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism.”  The section includes in its
definition of acts of international terrorism, “all activities that the Secretary [of State]
determines willfully aid or abet the international proliferation of nuclear explosive
devices to individuals or groups or willfully aid or abet an individual or groups in
acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear material.”6
The President may rescind the Secretary’s determination (sec. 40(f)) by
reporting to the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, before issuing the rescission, that the leadership and policies
of the country in question have changed, the government is not supporting
international terrorism, and the government has issued assurances that it will not
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support international terrorism in the future.  Congress may block the rescission of
the terrorist determination by enacting a joint resolution.  The President, however,
may unilaterally waive any or all of the prohibitions in this section if he determines
to do so is essential to the national security interests of the United States, and so
reports to Congress.
Those found to be in violation of the section face criminal prosecution with
penalties of as much as a $1 million fine and imprisonment of not more than ten
years.  Civil penalties for violations under this section, similar to those in sec. 38, are
capped at $500,000; the Secretary of State has the authority to assess civil penalties
and initiate civil actions against violators.
Section 40 was added by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism
Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-399; approved August 27, 1986), and later amended and
restated by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (Public
Law 101-222; approved August 27, 1986).  Sec. 822(a)(2)(A) of the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; Public Law103-236; approved April
30, 1994) added a definition of acts of international terrorism that would lead the
Secretary of State to make a determination.  The same section added definitions
“nuclear explosive device” and “unsafeguarded special nuclear material”.  Sec. 321
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law
102-138; approved October 28, 1991) made technical changes to the guidelines for
Congress’s passage of a joint resolution relating to the section.  Sec. 1303 of the
Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Security Assistance Act of 1999 (division B of
the Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 2000-2001; H.R. 3427,
enacted by reference in Public Law 106-113), gave civil action authority to the
Secretary of State.  Previously the section referred to such authority in the Export
Administration Act, which resides with the Secretary of Commerce and was capped
in that Act at $100,000.
Sections 72 and 73 (Denial of the Transfer of Missile Equipment or
Technology by U.S. Persons; 22 U.S.C. 2797a; Transfers of Missile Equipment
or Technology by Foreign Persons; 2797b), require sanctions against any U.S.
citizen or any foreign person whom the President determines to be engaged in
exporting, transferring, conspiring to export or transfer, or facilitating an export or
transfer of, any equipment or technology identified by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) that “contributes to the acquisition, design, development,
or production of missiles in a country that is not an MTCR adherent ...”  
Sanctions vary with the type of equipment or technology exported, and are
increasingly severe where the type of equipment or technology is more controlled.
Worst-case sanctions may be imposed for not less than two years, and include denial
of U.S. government contracts, denial of export licenses for items on the U.S.
Munitions List, and a prohibition on importation into the United States.
The law allows several exceptions, wherein some or all of the sanctions may not
be imposed against foreign persons:
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! if an MTCR adherent with jurisdictional authority finds the foreign
person innocent of wrongdoing in relation to the transaction;
! if the State Department issues an advisory opinion to the individual
stating that a transaction would not result in sanctions;
! if the export, transfer, or trading activity is authorized by the laws of
an MTCR adherent and not obtained by misrepresentation or fraud,
except when the activity in question is conducted by an entity
subordinate to a government of an independent state of the former
Soviet Union, and when the President determines that government
has knowingly transferred missiles or missile technology in a
manner inconsistent with MTCR guidelines;
! if the export, transfer, or trade is made to an end-user in a country
that is an MTCR adherent;
! in the case of foreign persons fulfilling contracts for defense services
or defense articles; then the President will not prohibit importations
if 
— the articles or services are considered essential to U.S.
national security, 
— the President determines that the provider is a sole
supplier and the articles or services are essential to
U.S. national security, or
— the President determines that the articles or services
are essential to U.S. national security under defense
cooperation agreements or NATO Programs of
Cooperation;
! in the case of foreign persons importing products or services into the
United States in fulfillment of contracts entered into before the
President announces intentions to impose sanctions, then the
President will not prohibit importations; or
! in the case of foreign persons providing spare parts, component parts
essential to U.S. products or production, routine service and
maintenance, essential information and technology.
Sanctions are not imposed, or those imposed may be lifted, against individuals
when the President certifies that a foreign government, which is an MTCR adherent,
has adequately attended to the violation through some judicial process or
enforcement action.
The President may waive the sanction, for either a U.S. citizen or foreign
person, if he certifies to Congress that it is essential to the national security of the
United States, or that the individual provides a product or service essential to U.S.
national security, and that person is sole provider of the product or service.
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Section 1703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
(Public Law 101-510; approved November 5, 1990) added sections 71-74.  In section
72, sec. 734(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995 (Public Law 103-236; approved April 30, 1994), added paragraph about
“presumption” in guidelines for Presidential determination on transfers of MTCR
Annex materials.  In sec. 73, sec. 323(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law102-138; approved October 28, 1991),
added assisting another country in acquiring missiles to the list of sanctionable acts;
sec. 1136 of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the
Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001;
H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in Public Law 106-113; approved November 29,
1999) added potential limitation on independent states of the former Soviet Union
and the President’s certification pertaining to judicial attention by MTCR adherents.
Sec. 734(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995
added the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to those with
whom the Secretary of State consults when administering the policy.  This language,
however, was struck out to conform with agency reorganization, particularly that of
ACDA being incorporated into the State Department, by sec. 1136 of the Arms
Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999.  Sec. 1408 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; approved February
10, 1996) made technical changes to reporting requirements relating to issuing a
waiver.
Section 73B (Authority Relating to MTCR Adherents; 22 U.S.C. 2797b-2)
authorizes the President to impose sanctions against a foreign person,
notwithstanding that person’s operating in compliance with the laws of an MTCR
adherent or that person exporting to an end-user in a country that is an MTCR
adherent, if the country of jurisdiction over that foreign person is a country (1) that
has entered into an understanding with the United States after January 1, 2000, (2)
for which the United States retains the right to impose sanctions against those in the
country’s jurisdiction for exporting of controlled items that contribute to the
acquisition, design, development, or production of missiles in a country that is not
an MTCR adherent.
Sec. 1137 of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the
Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001;
H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in Public Law. 106-113; approved November 29,
1999) added sec. 73B, and made supporting amendments in sec. 73 relating to
conditions of applicability, and sec. 74, defining “international understanding.”
Section 74 (Definitions; 22 U.S.C. 2797c) provides definitions of terms that
also affect how the sanctions may be applied.  For example, while the MTCR is a
policy statement originally announced on April 16, 1987, by the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, the term “MTCR
adherent” in this law is much more broadly defined, to include the countries that
participate in the MTCR “or that, pursuant to an international understanding to which
the United States is a party, controls MTCR equipment or technology in accordance
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with the criteria and standards set forth in the MTCR.”7  Within that definition, the
term “international understanding” has been further defined to limit its applicability
or to make the President’s authority to impose sanctions broader.  As another
example, the term “person” has changed over time.  The law formerly included as
part of the definition of “person,” “countries where it may be impossible to identify
a specific governmental entity.”  This has been amended to refer to “countries with
non-market economies (excluding former members of the Warsaw Pact).”  The same
definition formerly restricted government activity relating to development of aircraft;
this now refers specifically to military aircraft.
Sec. 323 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993 (Public Law 102-138; approved October 28, 1991) amended the definition of
“person” to target China—the “Helms amendment,” and narrowed the definition
of “person” to include activities of a government affecting the development of,
among other things, “military aircraft” (formerly referred to “aircraft”).  Sec.
1136(a) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the
Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001;
H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in Public Law 106-113; approved November 29,
1999) added the definition of “international understanding,” a term used in the
course of defining “MTCR adherent.” 
Section 81 ([CBW] Sanctions Against Foreign Persons; 22 U.S.C. 2798)
requires imposition of sanctions to deny government procurement, contracts with the
U.S. government, and imports from foreign persons who knowingly and materially
contribute, through exports from the United States or another country, or through
other transactions, to foreign efforts to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise
acquire chemical or biological weapons.  Foreign persons are sanctionable if the
recipient country has used chemical or biological weapons in violation of
international law, has used chemical or biological weapons against its own people,
or has made preparations to engage in such violations.  Foreign persons are
sanctionable if the recipient country has been determined to be a supporter of
international terrorism, pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, or
if the President has specifically designated the country as restricted under this
section.
The President may delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 180 days if he is
in consultation with the sanctionable person’s government to bring that government
to take specific and effective steps to terminate the sanctionable activities.  The
President may not be required to impose sanctions if the sanctionable person
otherwise provides goods needed for U.S. military operations, if the President
determines that the sanctionable person is a sole source provider of some good or
service, or if the President determines that goods and services provided by the
sanctionable person are essential to U.S. national security under defense cooperation
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Act of 1991 were enacted.  Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1992 (Public Law 102-138; approved October 28, 1991) enacted the first.  Later
in the same session, title III of Public Law 102-182 (a trade act otherwise unrelated to
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agreements.  Exceptions are also made for completing outstanding contracts, the
purchase of spare or component parts, service and maintenance otherwise not readily
available, information and technology essential to U.S. products or production, or
medical or other humanitarian items.
The President may terminate the sanctions after 12 months, if he determines and
certifies to Congress that the sanctioned person no longer aids or abets any foreign
government, project, or entity in its efforts to acquire biological or chemical weapons
capability.  The President may waive the application of a sanction after a year of its
imposition, if he determines it is in U.S. national security interests to do so.  Not less
than 20 days before a national security waiver is issued, the President must notify
Congress, fully explaining the rationale for waiving the sanction.
Sec. 81 was added by sec. 305 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of Public Law 102-182; approved
December 4, 1991.)8
Section 101 (Nuclear Enrichment Transfers; 22 U.S.C. 2799aa) (similar to
former section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) prohibits foreign
economic or miliary assistance to any country that the President determines delivers
or receives nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology.  The prohibition
is not required if the countries involved in the transaction agree to place all materials,
equipment, or technology under multilateral safeguard arrangements.  The
prohibition is not required, furthermore, if the recipient country has an agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding safeguards.
The President may waive the sanction if he determines, and certifies to the
Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that denying
assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests, and he has been
assured that the country in question will not acquire, develop, or assist others in
acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.  Congress may negate a certification by
enacting a joint resolution stating its disapproval.
Sec. 826(a) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; Public Law 103-
236; approved April 30, 1994) added secs. 101 and 102.  Similar language, however,
previously had been in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as secs. 669 and 670.
Sec. 669 was added by sec. 305 of the International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law  94-329; approved June 30, 1976). The
section was amended and restated by sec. 12 of the International Security Assistance
Act of 1977 (Public Law  95-92; approved August 4, 1977), which also added sec.
670 to the law.  Sec. 669 was further amended by secs. 10(b)(4) and 12 of the
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International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-384; approved
September 26, 1978).  Sec. 737(b) of the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law  97-113; approved December 29, 1981)
amended and restated both secs. 669 and 670.  Sec. 1204 of the International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83; approved
August 8, 1985), made further changes to sec. 670 before both sections were
repealed in 1994 and similar language was incorporated into the AECA.
Section 102 (Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Illegal Exports for Nuclear
Explosive Devices, Transfers of Nuclear Explosive Devices, and Nuclear
Detonations; 22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1) (similar to former section 670 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961) prohibits foreign economic or military assistance to
countries that the President determines deliver or receive nuclear reprocessing
equipment, material, or technology to or from another country; or any non-nuclear-
weapon state that illegally exports, through a person serving as that country’s agent,
from the United States items that would contribute to nuclear proliferation.
The President may waive the sanction if he determines, and certifies to the
Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that
terminating assistance would adversely impact on the United States’ nonproliferation
objectives, or would jeopardize the common defense and security.  Congress may
negate a certification by enacting a joint resolution stating its disapproval.
The section further prohibits assistance (except humanitarian or food
assistance), defense sales, export licenses for U.S. Munitions List items, other export
licenses subject to foreign policy controls (except medicines or medical equipment),
and various credits and loans (except Department of Agriculture credits and support
to procure food and agriculture commodities) to any country that the President has
determined (A) transfers a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-weapon state;
(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and either (i) receives a nuclear explosive device;
or (ii) detonates an nuclear explosive device; (C) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon
state any design information or component that is determined by the President to be
important to, and known by the transferring country to be intended by the recipient
state for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive devices;
or (D) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and seeks and receives any design information
or component that is determined by the President to be important to, and intended by
the recipient state for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear
explosive device.
In any of these latter four instances, sanctions are mandatory once the President
has determined that an event has occurred.  If the event has to do with transferring
a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-weapon state, or a non-nuclear-weapon
state receiving or detonating  a nuclear explosive device, the President may delay the
imposition of sanctions for 30 days (of congressional continuous session) if he
determines that the immediate imposition of sanctions “would be detrimental to the
national security of the United States,” and so certifies to the Speaker of the House
and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
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9 Sec. 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
Public Law  94-329.  See Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2001, vol. I-A, p. 635.
10 Sanctions under sec. 102 were applied to India and Pakistan after each country tested
nuclear explosive devices in May 1998.  Congress enacted four laws after the sanctions were
imposed to ease their application or authorize the President to waive their application.  See
the Agriculture Export Relief Act of 1998 (P.L.105-194; approved July 14, 1998), India-
Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (title IX of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21, 1998), the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000, title IX (P.L. 106-79; approved October
25, 1999), and Public Law 107-57 (approved October 27, 2001; 115 Stat. 403), which
provide foreign assistance relief to Pakistan through October 2003.
11 Medicine and food were further exempted from the application of sanctions in most cases
with the enactment of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
Act (P.L. 106-387; approved October 28, 2000).  For further discussion, see: Jurenas, Remy.
Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and
Implementation.  CRS Issue Brief IB10061.
If the President makes such a determination, he may further waive the
imposition of sanctions if the Congress, within those 30 days after the first
determination, takes up a joint resolution under expedited procedure,9 that states:
That the Congress having received on ________ a certification by the President
under section 102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to
________, the Congress hereby authorizes the President to exercise the waiver
authority contained in section 102(b)(5) of that Act.
With passage of a joint resolution authorizing him to exercise further waiver
authority, the President may waive any sanction which would otherwise be required
in instances involving the transferring of a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-
weapon state, or a non-nuclear-weapon state receiving or detonating  a nuclear
explosive device.  To exercise this waiver, the President determines and certifies in
writing to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
“that the imposition of such sanction would be seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of United State nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the
common defense and security.”
Alternatively, if Congress does not take up a relevant joint resolution within the
30 days, the sanctions enter into effect.  Section 102 does not state the means for
otherwise suspending or terminating the sanctions.10
For legislative history of the origin of and early changes to this section, see
discussion following sec. 101, above.  Sec. 2(a) of the Agriculture Export Relief Act
of 1998 (Public Law 105-194; approved July 14, 1998) broadened the kinds of
exchanges that are exempt from the application of sanctions to include medicine,
medical equipment, and Department of Agriculture financing.11
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Public Law 99-183, a joint resolution approving an Agreement for Nuclear
Cooperation Between the United States and China, (approved December 16, 1985; 99 Stat.
1174.  Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2000, vol. II, p. 1902), required
Presidential certification that China was not violating section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954.  On January 12, 1998, President Clinton made such a determination, also certifying
that China had met nuclear weapons nonproliferation standards stated in section
902(a)(6)(B)(i) of Public Law 101-246 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note; often referred to as the
“Tiananmen Square sanctions”).  See Presidential Determination No. 98-10 (63 F.R. 3447;
January 23, 1998).
Atomic Energy Act of 195412
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 declares U.S. policy for the development, use,
and control of atomic energy.  The Act authorizes the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to oversee the export of special nuclear materials and nuclear
technology in accordance with bilateral and international cooperation agreements
negotiated by the Department of State.  The Act defines the nature and requirements
of those cooperative agreements and the procedure by which Congress reviews them.
The Act states export licensing criteria for nuclear materials and sensitive equipment
and technology.
Section 129 (Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports; 42
U.S.C. 2158) prohibits the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, or sensitive
technology from the United States to any non-nuclear-weapon state that the President
finds to have detonated a nuclear explosive device, terminated or abrogated
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), materially violated
an IAEA safeguards agreement, or engaged in manufacture or acquisition of nuclear
explosive devices.  The section similarly prohibits transfers to any country, or group
of countries, that the President finds to have violated a nuclear cooperation agreement
with the United States, assisted, encouraged, or induced a non-nuclear-weapon state
to engage in certain activities related to nuclear explosive devices, or agreed to
transfer reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to a non-nuclear-weapon
state, except under certain conditions.
The President may waive the restriction if he determines that the prohibition
would hinder U.S. nonproliferation objectives or jeopardize the common defense and
security.  Sixty days before a determination is issued, the President is required to
forward his reasons for waiving the sanctions to Congress, which may block the
waiver by adopting a concurrent resolution.  Congress may alternatively counter the
Presidential determination with passage of a joint resolution within 45 days of the
President’s action.
Sec. 307 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law  95-242;
approved March 10, 1978) added sec. 129.
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13 Public Law  102-182; approved December 4, 1991; 22 U.S.C. 5601-5606.   Legislation
on Foreign Relations Through 2000, vol. II, p. 1772.
14 Two versions of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991 were enacted.  Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1992 (Public Law  102-138; approved October 28, 1991) enacted the first.  Later
in the same session, title III of Public Law  102-182 (a trade act otherwise unrelated to
nonproliferation issues) repealed the first version and enacted a new Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.  This report refers only
to the second enactment—that which currently stands in law.
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control 
and Warfare Elimination Act of 199113
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act
of 1991 mandates U.S. sanctions, and encourages international sanctions, against
countries that use chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law.
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act
of 1991 was enacted as title III of Public Law  102-182 (a law dealing with trade
issues otherwise unrelated to nonproliferation).  No amendments have been
enacted.14
Section 307 (Sanctions Against Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons; 22
U.S.C. 5605) requires the President to terminate foreign assistance (except
humanitarian, food, and agricultural assistance) arms sales and licenses, credits,
guarantees, and certain exports to a government of a foreign country that he has
determined has used or made substantial preparation to use chemical or biological
weapons.  Within three months, the President must determine and certify to Congress
that the government: is no longer using chemical or biological weapons in violation
of international law, is no longer using such weapons against its own people, has
provided credible assurances that such behavior will not resume, and is willing to
cooperate with U.N. or other international observers to verify that biological and
chemical weapons are not still in use.  Without this 3-month determination, sanctions
are required affecting multilateral development bank loans, U.S. bank loans or
credits, exports, imports, diplomatic relations, and aviation access to and from the
United States.
The President may lift the sanctions after a year, with a determination and
certification to Congress that the foreign government has met the conditions listed
above, and that it is making restitution to those affected by its use of chemical or
biological weapons.
The President may waive the imposition of these sanctions if he determines and
certifies to Congress and the appropriate committees that such a waiver is essential
to U.S. national security interests.
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16 See S.Res. 75, 105th Congress, 1st Session.
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 199815
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 implements
the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was originally signed on January 13,
1993, and to which the United States became a party on April 29, 1997.16  The
Convention bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical
weapons, requires the destruction of existing weapons and related materials,
establishes an international verification regime, and requires export controls and
punitive measures to be leveled for noncompliance.
Section 103 (Civil Liability of the United States; 22 U.S.C. 6713) requires a
wide range of sanctions to be imposed, for a period of not less than ten years, on an
individual who is a member of, or affiliated with, the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons “whose actions or omissions the United States has been held
liable for a tort or taking...” or a foreign company or an individual affiliated with that
company, “which knowingly assisted, encouraged, or induced, in any way, a foreign
person” affiliated with the Organization “to publish, divulge, disclose, or make
known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by the Convention any United
States confidential business information” including:
! no arms export transactions – sales of items on U.S. Munitions List,
transactions under Arms Export Control Act; no licenses for goods
or services covered by foreign policy controls under the Export
Administration Act of 1979;
! U.S. opposition to support from international financial institutions;
! no U.S. Export-Import Bank transactions;
! prohibition on U.S. private banks engaging with sanctions person;
! assets in United States to be frozen by Presidential action; and
! no rights to land aircraft in the United States (other than in cases of
emergency).
The Secretary of State is further required to deny a visa to any individual affiliated
with the Organization who divulges any confidential U.S. business if that disclosure
results in financial loss or damages.
The section requires the President to impose similar sanctions on any foreign
government found by the President to have similarly divulged such information, with
the sanctions imposed for not less than five years.  Foreign countries are further
subject to:
! no U.S. economic assistance (other than humanitarian assistance),
military assistance, foreign military financing, grant military
education and training, military credits, guarantees; and no export
licensing for commercial satellites.
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Foreign Relations Through 1996, vol. III, p. 1022.   Authority granted by the Export
Administration Act was continued to August 20, 2001, by the Export Administration
Modification and Clarification Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-508; approved November 13,
2000).  Approaching another expiration, President Bush invoked authority granted his office
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and National Emergencies
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authorities of the Export Administration Act for one year. Such steps have precedent: the
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18 Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) and sec. 40 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) grant similar authority to the Secretary of State
to withhold assistance and programs governed by those two laws.  See Legislation on
Foreign Relations Through 2001, vol. I-A, pages 293, 439, respectively.  See also sec. 40A
of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2781), which denies defense articles and defense services to a
foreign country the President has determined is not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism
efforts; Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2001, vol. I-A, page 446.
Sanctions may be suspended if the sanctioned entity fully and completely
compensates the U.S. government to cover the liability.  The President, alternatively,
may waive the sanctions if he determines and notifies Congress that U.S. national
security interests are served by such a waiver.
Export Administration Act of 197917
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) authorizes the executive branch
to regulate private sector exports of particular goods and technology to other
countries.  The EAA coordinates such actions with other foreign policy
considerations, including nonproliferation, and determines eligibility of recipients for
exports.  Section 5 (National Security Controls; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404) authorizes
the President to curtail or prohibit the export of any goods or services for national
security reasons: to comply with other laws regarding a potential recipient country’s
political status or political stability, to cooperate with international agreements or
understandings, or to protect militarily critical technologies.  Section 6 (Foreign
Policy Controls; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405) similarly authorizes the President to curtail
or prohibit the export of goods or services for foreign policy reasons.  Within section
6, for example, section 6(j) establishes the State Department’s list of countries found
to be supporting acts of international terrorism, a list on which many other
restrictions and prohibitions in law are based.18  Section 6(k) restricts exportation of
certain crime control equipment.  Section 6(l) restricts exportation for a list of dual
use goods and technology.  Section 6(m) restricts exportation for a list of goods and
technology that would directly and substantially assist a foreign government or group
in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver chemical or
biological weapons.
Section 11A (Multilateral Export Control Violations; 50 U.S.C. app. 2410a)
requires the President to prohibit, for two to five years, the U.S. government from
contracting with or procuring goods or services from  a foreign person that has
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violated any country’s national security export regulations in accordance with the
agreement of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM),19 and that the violation results “in substantial enhancement of Soviet and
East Bloc capabilities in submarines or antisubmarine warfare, ballistic or
antiballistic missiles technology, strategic aircraft, command, control,
communications and intelligence, or other critical technologies.”  The President also
is required generally to prohibit importation of products from the sanctioned person.
The President may impose sanctions at his discretion if the first but not the second
condition exists.  In this case, the restrictions may be in place no longer than five
years.
Sanctions may not be required for some goods if contracts with the sanctionable
person meet U.S. operational military requirements, if the President determines that
the sanctionable person is a sole source provider of an essential defense article or
service, or if the President determines that such articles or services are essential to
U.S. national security under defense coproduction agreements.  The President also
may not be required to apply sanctions if he determines that a company affiliated
with the sanctionable person had no knowledge of the export control violation.  After
sanctions have been in place for two years, the President may modify terms of the
restrictions under certain conditions, and if he notifies Congress.
Sec. 2444 of the Multilateral Export Control Enhancement Amendments Act
(title II, subtitle D, part II of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988;
Public Law  100-418; approved August 23, 1988) added sec. 11A.  The section has
not been amended.
Section 11B (Missile Proliferation Control Violations; 50 U.S.C. app.
2410b) is similar to sections 72 and 73 of the AECA, but authorizes sanctions against
U.S. persons and foreign persons who engage in commercial transactions that violate
missile proliferation controls.  The section requires sanctions against any U.S. citizen
who the President determines to be engaged in exporting, transferring, conspiring to
export or transfer, or facilitating an export or transfer of, any equipment or
technology identified by the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex.  Sanctions
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vary with the type of equipment or technology exported; worst-case sanctions deny
export licenses for goods on the U.S. Commodity List for not less than two years.
The President may waive the imposition of sanctions if he certifies to Congress
that the product or service to be restricted is essential to U.S. national security, and
that the provider is a sole source provider.
The section further requires sanctions against any foreign person who the
President determines to be engaged in exporting, transferring, conspiring to export
or transfer, or facilitating an export or transfer of, any MTCR equipment or
technology that contributes to the design, development, or production of missiles in
a country that is not an MTCR adherent.  Sanctions vary with the type of equipment
or technology exported; worst-case sanctions deny licenses for transfer to the foreign
person items otherwise controlled by the Export Administration Act for not less than
two years.  The President may also prohibit importation into the United States of
products produced by the foreign person.
The law allows several exceptions, wherein some or all of the sanctions may not
be imposed against foreign persons.  These exceptions are nearly identical to those
found in sections 72 and 73 of the AECA.  The President may waive the imposition
of sanctions for national security reasons, but must notify Congress beforehand.  The
Presidential authority to restrict importation is conditional in a manner identical to
that in section 73 of the AECA.
The definition of “MTCR adherent” in section 11B is also identical to that in
section 74 of the AECA.  The definition of “person,” however, retains its earlier
form, applying to all “countries where it may be impossible to identify a specific
governmental entity,” and not adopting the narrower reference to military aircraft but
referring to government activity relating to development of aircraft generally.
Sec. 1702(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
(Public Law  101-510; approved November 5, 1990) added sec. 11B.  The section
has not been amended.
Section 11C (Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation Sanctions; 50
U.S.C. app. 2410c), similar to section 81 of the AECA, authorizes the President to
apply procurement and import sanctions against foreign persons that he determines
knowingly contribute to the use, development, production, stockpile, or acquisition
of chemical or biological weapons by exporting goods or technology from the United
States or any other country.
The President may delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 180 days if he is
in consultation with the sanctionable person’s government to bring that government
to take specific and effective steps to terminate the sanctionable activities.  The
President may not be required to impose or maintain sanctions if the sanctionable
person otherwise provides goods needed for U.S. military operations, if the President
determines that the sanctionable person is a sole source provider of some good or
service, or if the President determines that goods and services provided by the
sanctionable person are essential to U.S. national security under defense cooperation
agreements.  Exceptions are also made for completing outstanding contracts, the
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purchase of spare or component parts, service and maintenance otherwise not readily
available, information and technology essential to U.S. products or production, or
medical or other humanitarian items.
The President may terminate the sanctions after 12 months, if he determines and
certifies to Congress that the sanctioned person no longer aids or abets any foreign
government, project, or entity in its efforts to acquire biological or chemical weapons
capability.  The President may waive the application of a sanction after a year of its
imposition, if he determines it is in U.S. national security interests to do so.  Not less
than 20 days before a national security waiver is issued, the President must notify
Congress, fully explaining the rationale for waiving the sanction.
Sec. 505(a) of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of Public Law  102-182; approved December 4,
1991) added sec. 11C.  No amendments have been enacted.
Export-Import Bank Act of 194520
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 establishes the Export-Import Bank of the
United States and authorizes the Bank to finance and facilitate exports and imports
and the exchange of commodities and services between the United States and foreign
countries.
Section 2(b)(1)(B) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B)) generally states the United States’
policy of administering loan programs through the Export-Import Bank.  The section
provides that the Bank will deny applications for credit for nonfinancial or
noncommercial considerations only when the President determines it is in the U.S.
national interest to deny credit to advance U.S. policies in international terrorism –
including taking into account a nation’s lack of cooperation in efforts to eradicate
terrorism –  nuclear proliferation, environmental protection, and human rights.
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 was enacted as Public Law  79-173;
approved July 31, 1945.  Sec. 2(b)(1) has been amended and restated in 1972 (Public
Law  92-126) and again in 1974 (Public Law  93-646).  The language pertaining to
“international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, ...” was added by sec. 1904 of the
Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1978 (title XIX of the Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978; Public Law  95-630; approved
November 10, 1978).  The Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002 (P.L.
107-189; approved June 14, 2002) added a reference to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10,
1948 after human rights (sec. 15), added language pertaining to a nation’s lack of
cooperation with efforts to eradicate terrorism (sec. 17), and added enforcement of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as
justification for denying Export-Import Bank financing (sec. 21).  Numerous
technical changes were made by P.L. 107-189, as well.
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Section 2(b)(4) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)) provides that the Secretary of State can
determine, and report to Congress and to the Export-Import Bank Directors, if:
! any country has agreed to IAEA nuclear safeguards but has
materially violated, abrogated, or terminated such safeguards after
October 26, 1977;
! any country has entered into a cooperation agreement with the
United States concerning the use of civil nuclear energy, but has
violated, abrogated, or terminated any guarantee or other
undertaking related to that agreement after October 26, 1977;
! any country has detonated a nuclear explosive device after October
26, 1977, but is a not a nuclear-weapon state; 
! any country willfully aids or abets, after June 29, 1994, any non-
nuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or to
acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material; or
! any person knowingly aids or abets, after September 23, 1996, any
non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or
to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material.
If such a determination is made relating to a person, the Secretary is urged to consult
with that person’s government to curtail that person’s activities.  Consultations are
allowed 90 days, at the end of which the Secretary will report to Congress as to their
progress.  After the 90 days, unless the Secretary requests an additional 90 days, or
unless the Secretary reports that the violations have ceased, the Ex-Im Bank will not
approve any transactions to support U.S. exports to any country, or to or by any
person, for which/whom a determination has been made.  The imposition of
sanctions may also be waived if the President, 45 days before any transaction is
approved, certifies that the violations have ceased, and that steps have been taken to
ensure the questionable transactions will not resume.  The President may also waive
the imposition of sanction if he certifies that to impose them would have a serious
adverse effect on vital U.S. interests, or if he certifies that objectionable behavior has
ceased.
Sec. 2(b)(4) was added by sec. 3(b) of Public Law  95-143; approved October
26, 1977.  Sec. 825 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; Public Law
103-236; approved April 30, 1994) added “(as defined in section 830(4) of the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994), or that any country has willfully
aided or abetted any non-nuclear-weapons state (as defined in section 830(5) of that
Act) to acquire any such nuclear explosive device or to acquire unsafeguarded
special nuclear material (as defined in section 830(8) of that Act).”  to define
“nuclear explosive device” and to broaden what acts are sanctionable.  This is
referred to as a “Glenn Amendment.”  The section was further amended and restated
by sec. 1303 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public
Law  104-201; approved September 23, 1996).  Sec. 1303(b) of that Act further
required the President to report to Congress within 180 days “his recommendations
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interdict, and counter proliferation”.
on ways to make the laws of the United States more effective in controlling and
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.  The report
shall identify all sources of government funds used for such nonproliferation
activities.”
Section 2(b)(12) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(12)) requires the President to notify the
Export-Import Bank if he determines “that the military or Government of the Russian
Federation has transferred or delivered to the People’s Republic of China an SS-N-22
missile system and that the transfer or delivery represents a significant and imminent
threat to the security of the United States...  Upon receipt of the notice and if so
directed by the President of the United States, the Board of Directors of the Bank
shall not give approval to guarantee, insure, extend credit, or participate in the
extension of credit in connection with the purchase of any good or service by the
military or Government of the Russian Federation.”
Sec. 12 of the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 1997 (Public Law
105-121; approved November 26, 1997) added paragraph 12.
Foreign Assistance Act of 196121
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) authorizes U.S. government foreign
aid programs including development assistance, economic support funding,
numerous multilateral programs, housing and other credit guaranty programs,
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, international organizations, debt-for-nature
exchanges, international narcotics control, international disaster assistance,
development funding for Africa, assistance to states of the former Soviet Union,
military assistance, international military education and training, peacekeeping,
antiterrorism, and various regional enterprise funds.
Section 307(c) (Withholding of United States Proportionate Share for
Certain Programs of International Organizations; 22 U.S.C. 2227) requires that
foreign assistance the United States pays in to international organizations and
programs not be used for programs in certain countries.  The section exempts the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from this limitation, except for
particular projects the IAEA funds in Cuba.  U.S. proportionate support to the IAEA,
in particular, is not available to any IAEA project relating to the Juragua Nuclear
Power Plant near Cienfugeos, Cuba, or the Pedro Pi Nuclear Research Center in
Cuba, unless Cuba (I) ratifies the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
or the Treaty of Tlatelelco and is in compliance with terms of the treaty; (II)
negotiates full-scope safeguards of the IAEA not later than two years after treaty
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ratification; and (III) “incorporates internationally accepted nuclear safety
safeguards.”
Section 307 was added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by sec. 403 of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-
83; approved August 8, 1985).  The countries to which it is applied has changed over
time; the countries for which program funding is currently restricted are Burma,
Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Iran, Cuba, and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (though application to the PLO has been waived under other
legislation in the course of peace negotiations), and communist countries listed
elsewhere in the Act.  Limitations in subsec. (c) were originally added by sec.
431(a)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 1994 and 1995 (Public Law
103-236; approved April 30, 1994).  Language pertaining to nuclear developments
in Cuba was added by sec. 2809(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
1998 and 1999 (subdivision B of division G of Public Law 105-277; approved
October 21, 1998).
Section 498A(b) (Criteria for Assistance to Governments of the
Independent States; 22 U.S.C. 2295a(b)) requires that the President not provide
assistance to independent states of the former Soviet Union if he determines that the
government of that state, among other things, (1) has failed to implement arms
control obligations signed by the former Soviet Union, or (2) has knowingly
transferred to another country: missiles or missile technology inconsistent with
guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime; “any material,
equipment, or technology that would contribute significantly to the ability of such
country to manufacture any weapon of mass destruction (including nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons) if the President determines that the material, equipment, or
technology was to be used by such country in the manufacture of such weapon.”  The
section further prohibits foreign assistance under chapter 11 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 to any country for which a determination has been issued
pursuant to sections 101 or 102 of the Arms Export Control Act or sections 306(a)(1)
or 307 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991.
The President may waive the prohibition – other than that based on other
proliferation legislation as cited in the section – on U.S. national security grounds,
if he determines that furnishing assistance “will foster respect for internationally
recognized human rights and the rule of law or the development of institutions of
democratic governance,” or to alleviate suffering resulting from a natural or man-
made disaster.  Assistance may also be provided under the U.S. Information
Agency’s (USIA) secondary school exchange program notwithstanding a country’s
ineligibility (except in instances where ineligibility is based on nonproliferation
violations).  Any waiver requires an immediate report to Congress of any
determination or decision.
Section 498A was added by sec. 201 of the FREEDOM Support Act (Public Law
102-511; approved October 24, 1992).  See also discussion above, on sec. 73(b)(2)
and sec. 73B of the AECA, as amended.  Those sections refer to sec. 498A(b)(3)(A)
to limit certain transactions with independent states of the former Soviet Union if the
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22 Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) and sec. 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (50 U.S.C. app. 2404) grant similar authority to the Secretary of State
to withhold assistance and programs governed by those two laws.  See also sec. 40A of the
AECA (22 U.S.C. 2781), which denies defense articles and defense services to a foreign
country the President has determined is not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
transactions involve missiles or missile technology and are conducted in a manner
inconsistent with guidelines and parameters of the MTCR.
Section 620(y) (Prohibitions Against Furnishing Assistance; 22 U.S.C. 2370)
restricts foreign assistance, or assistance pursuant to any other act, to any country
providing nuclear fuel, related assistance, and credits to Cuba.  Assistance denied the
country in question equals the value of that country’s nuclear development assistance,
sales, or transfers to Cuba.  The requirement to limit assistance is waived if Cuba (A)
ratifies the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or the Treaty of
Tlatelelco and is in compliance with terms of the treaty; (B) “has negotiated and is
in full compliance with full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy
Agency” within two years of the treaty ratification; and (C) “incorporates and is in
compliance with internationally accepted nuclear safety safeguards.”  The section
also requires an annual report on the matter to filed with Congress by the Secretary
of State.
Added by sec. 2810(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1998 and 1999 (subdivision B of Division G of Public Law 105-277; approved
October 21, 1998).
Section 620A (Prohibition on Assistance to Governments Supporting
International Terrorism; 22 U.S.C. 2371) prohibits any foreign assistance, food
assistance, Peace Corps funding, and support under the Export-Import Bank Act of
1945 from being made available to countries that the Secretary of State has certified
as supporters of international terrorism.22  The restriction remains in place until such
time that the Secretary certifies that there has been a fundamental change in the
leadership and policies of the targeted country, the country is no longer supporting
international terrorists, and that the targeted government has assured no such support
will resume.
The President may waive the prohibition on the basis of U.S. national security,
and some assistance may be restored to address humanitarian concerns.  A waiver
requires notification and justification being provided to Congress 15 days before
assistance is given.
Section 620A was added by sec. 303 of the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law  94-329; approved June 30, 1976).
The section has been amended and restated since then by sec. 503(a) of the
International Security Assistance and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public
Law  99-83; approved August 8, 1985) and sec. 5 of the Anti-Terrorism and Arms
Export Amendments Act of 1989 (Public Law  101-222; approved December 12,
1989).
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Section 620E (Assistance to Pakistan; 22 U.S.C. 2375), related to U.S.
assistance to Pakistan, was enacted in reaction to the threat posed by Soviet
occupation of neighboring Afghanistan.  Section 620E(d) authorizes the President
to waive sanctions under section 101 of the AECA to provide assistance to Pakistan,
if he determines it is in the U.S. national interest to do so.
Subsection 620E(e) states that no military assistance shall be furnished and no
military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan unless the
President certifies to the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that, for the fiscal year in which the assistance, sale or
transfer would occur, Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that
proposed military assistance would significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will
possess a nuclear explosive device.  This restriction does not apply to international
narcotics control assistance, International Military Education and Training funds,
funding for humanitarian and civic assistance projects, peacekeeping or other
multilateral operations funds, or antiterrorism assistance.
Enacted as Public Law  87-195; approved September 4, 1961.  Sec. 620E was
added to the Foreign Assistance Act by sec. 736 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law  97-113; approved December 29,
1981).  Sec. 620E(d) was amended in 1994 by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention
Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994
and 1995; Public Law  103-236; approved April 30, 1994) to reflect the repeal of
secs. 669 and 670 and the enactment of secs. 101 and 102 of the Arms Export
Control Act.  Sec. 620E(e), the “Pressler amendment,” was added by sec. 902 of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law  99-
83; approved August 8, 1985).  Sec. 559(a)(1)(D) of the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996 (Public Law  104-107;
approved February 12, 1996), amended the section to exclude certain assistance
programs from the ban, as noted in the last sentence, above.  The same Act made
several changes to restrict only “military assistance,” formerly the section had
referred to assistance generally.  The same Act amended the section to authorize the
President to: release Pakistan from paying storage costs of items purchased before
October 1, 1990, but not delivered (presumably F-16s); release other items serviced
in the United States; and continue the applicability of other laws pertaining to
ballistic missile sanctions.
After India and Pakistan tested nuclear explosive devices in May 1998,
sanctions were imposed in accordance with requirements of sec. 102 of the Arms
Export Control Act (see above).  Subsequently, Congress enacted four laws to grant
the President discretionary authority to waive those sanctions.  The third, the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-79; approved
October 21, 1999; see title IX), authorized the President to waive section 620E(e).
President Bush exercised this authority in issuing Presidential Determination No.
2001-28 on September 22, 2001 (66 F.R. 50095).  The fourth measure, Public Law
107-57 (115 Stat. 403, approved October 27, 2001), authorized the President to
waive remaining restrictions on foreign assistance to Pakistan. 
Section 620G (Prohibition on Assistance to Countries that Aid Terrorist
States; 22 U.S.C. 2377) requires the President to withhold all foreign assistance to
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the government of any country that provides assistance to the government of a
country listed as a terrorist state by the Secretary of State pursuant to sec. 620A of
this Act (22 U.S.C. 2370).  
The President may waive the imposition of the sanction if he determines that
furnishing such assistance is important to the U.S. national interest and notifies the
appropriate congressional committees of his intent 15 days prior to lifting the ban.
His notification shall include the determination, a detailed explanation of the
assistance to be provided with its estimated dollar amount, and an explanation of how
such assistance furthers U.S. national interests.
Section 620G was added by sec. 325 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law  104-132; approved April 24, 1996).  See also sec.
40 of the AECA (above).
Section 620H (Prohibition on Assistance to Countries that Provide Lethal
Military Equipment to Terrorist States; 22 U.S.C. 2378) requires the President to
withhold all foreign assistance to the government of any country that provides lethal
military equipment to a country listed by the Secretary of State as a supporter of
international terrorism, either on the sec. 6(j) list under the Export Administration
Act, or the sec. 620A list pursuant to this Act.  The prohibition remains in place until
one year after such transfers or transactions cease.  The section is not retroactive, but
includes all contracts entered into after April 24, 1996 (the date of enactment of the
amendment).
The President may waive the imposition of the sanction if he determines that
furnishing such assistance is important to the U.S. national interest and notifies the
appropriate congressional committees of his intent 15 days prior to lifting the ban.
His notification shall include the determination, a detailed explanation of the
assistance to be provided with its estimated dollar amount, and an explanation of how
such assistance furthers U.S. national interests.
Section 620H was added by sec. 326 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law  104-132; approved April 14, 1996).
Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 200223
A Foreign Operations Appropriations Act is enacted annually, generally at the
start of a fiscal year, to make appropriations for various foreign assistance, military
assistance, and international financial institutions programs.  Language in the current
fiscal year act pertains only to that fiscal year unless otherwise expressly stated.
Congress has not enacted a comprehensive foreign aid authorization bill since 1985,
however; as a result, the annual appropriations act increasingly has become a means
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of enacting authorizing language that carries the force of law beyond the fiscal year.
(Freestanding authorization bills for security assistance programs and related funding
levels, however, were enacted in FYs 1999 and 2000.)
Title I, Export-Import Bank of the United States, prohibits the use of Export-
Import Bank funds in the current fiscal year to be used to make expenditures,
contracts, or commitments for the export of nuclear equipment, fuel or technology
to any non-nuclear-weapon state, if that state is otherwise eligible to receive
economic or military assistance under this Act.
Title II, Assistance for the New Independent States of the Former Soviet
Union, appropriates $784 million for assistance to the states of the former Soviet
Union, of which not less than $154 million is directed to Ukraine and of that amount,
not less than $30 million “should be made available for nuclear reactor safety
initiatives”.  The title withholds 60 percent of funds obligated for the Government
of Russia until the President determines and certifies to the Committees on
Appropriations that the Government of Russia has terminated its efforts “to provide
Iran with technical expertise, training, technology, or equipment necessary to develop
a nuclear reactor, related nuclear research facilities or programs, or ballistic missile
capability.”  The restriction does not apply to assistance for combating infectious
diseases, child survival activities, assistance for victims of trafficking in persons, and
nonproliferation and disarmament programs authorized under title V of the
FREEDOM Support Act.
Congress has incorporated this language into the foreign assistance
appropriations bill for several years.  In previous years, the President was
authorized to waive the restriction on the basis of vital U.S. national security
interests, or if he found that the Government of Russia was taking meaningful steps
to limit major supply contracts and to curtail the transfer of technology and technical
expertise to certain programs in Iran.  The FY2002 Act does not include such a
waiver.
Section 544, Prohibition on Assistance to Foreign Governments That
Export Lethal Military Equipment to Countries Supporting International
Terrorism, prohibits assistance to such foreign governments that provide equipment
to any country the government of which the Secretary of State has found, pursuant
to  sec. 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, to be a terrorist government.  The
President may waive the prohibition if he determines it important to U.S. national
interests to do so, but must report to Congress the basis for the determination, the
nature and value of resumed assistance, and an explanation of how such assistance
furthers U.S. national interests.  The sanction is in place for 12 months after the
targeted government ceases providing lethal military equipment.
Similar language has been included in the annual foreign assistance
appropriations measure since FY1994.  Previous years’ Acts have referred to
findings pursuant to sec. 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act.
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24 50 U.S.C. 1701 and following.   Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996, vol. III,
p. 1144.
25 The “situations in which authorities may be exercised” is stated in sec. 202 (50 U.S.C.
1701).
26 Unless otherwise noted, all codified at 50 U.S.C. 1701 note, see: Executive Order 12938,
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (November 14, 1994; 59 F.R. 59099,
amended);  Executive Order 12947, Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten
To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (January 23, 1995; 60 F.R. 5079); Executive
Order 12957, Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Development of Iran
Petroleum Resources (March 15, 1995; 60 F.R. 14615); Executive Order 12959, Prohibiting
Certain Transactions with respect to Iran (May 6, 1995; 60 F.R. 24757); Executive Order
13059, Prohibiting Certain transactions with Respect to Iran (August 19, 1997; 62 F.R.
44531); Executive Order 13159, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian
Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear
Weapons (June 21, 2000; 65 F.R. 39279);  Executive Order 13222, Administration of Export
Controls (August 17, 2001; 66 F.R. 44025); Executive Order 13026, Administration of
Export Controls on Encryption Products (November 15, 1996; 61 F.R. 58767; 50 U.S.C.
App. 2401 note); and Executive Order 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism
(September 23, 2001; 66 F.R. 49079; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).  The President also uses the
authority in IEEPA to issue executive orders to implement United Nations Security Council
Resolutions.  Of the several that are current, Executive Order 12724, Blocking Iraqi
Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq (August 9, 1990; 55 F.R.
33089; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) has relevance to issues of proliferation.
International Emergency Economic Powers Act24
Section 203 (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. 1702) authorizes the President
“to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to a declared national
emergency.”25  After he declares a national emergency exists, pursuant to the
authority in the National Emergencies Act, the President may use the authority in this
section to investigate, regulate, or prohibit foreign exchange transactions, credit
transfers or payments, currency or security transfers, and may take specified actions
relating to property in which a foreign country  or person has interest.  In terms of
nonproliferation concerns, it is pursuant to this section that the President has
continued the authority of the expired Export Administration Act, prohibited
transactions with “those who disrupt the Middle East peace process,” issued export
controls on encryption items,  established export controls related to weapons of mass
destruction, and prohibited transactions “with persons who commit, threaten to
commit, or support terrorism.”26
Enacted as title II of Public Law  95-223; approved December 28, 1977, to
update and continue authority carried earlier in the Trading With the Enemy Act
(Public Law  65-92; approved October 6, 1917).  It has been amended from time to
time to update the list of what cannot be restricted, mostly to keep up with changes
in technology (for example, the law allows the free flow of informational materials,
most recently amended to include CD ROMs).
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Iran and Libya Sanctions Act27
Section 5 (Imposition of Sanctions) requires the President to impose sanctions
on persons found to have invested in Iran – investments “that directly and
significantly contributed to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum
resources...”  The section also requires the imposition of sanctions if a person is
found to have “exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Libya any goods,
services, technology, or other items the provision of which...” contribute to “Libya’s
ability to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or destabilizing numbers
and types of advances conventional weapons or enhanced Libya’s military or
paramilitary capabilities...”  
Section 6 (Description of Sanctions) authorizes the President to employ a
range of punitive measures, including denial of Export-Import funding, denial of
export licenses, prohibition on U.S. government and commercial bank financing,
refusal of U.S. government procurement contracts, and additional measures as the
President sees fit.
Section 8 (Termination of Sanctions) cancels the requirement for sanctions if
the President determines that Iran has ceased all efforts to design, develop,
manufacture, or acquire weapons of mass destruction or related delivery systems, and
if Iran is removed from the list of supporters of international terrorism.  For Libya,
the President may be relieved of the requirement to impose sanctions if he finds that
country has complied with United Nations resolutions issued in the wake of the
PanAm Flight 103 explosion over Lockerbie, Scotland.
Section 9 (Duration of Sanctions; Presidential Waiver) authorizes the
President to delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 90 days if consultations are
entered into with a government that holds jurisdiction over the offending party.
Sanctions may be further delayed another 90 days if the government of jurisdiction
takes action to terminate the offending behavior and penalize the offender.
Otherwise, sanctions are imposed for not less than two years or until such time that
the President can certify that the offending behavior has ceased, at which juncture
sanctions remain in place for at least one year.  Alternatively, the President may
waive the imposition of sanctions if he finds it important to U.S. national interests
to do so.
P.L. 104-172; approved August 5, 1996.  It has been amended to lower the
threshold of investment in Libya that triggers the imposition of sanctions, change
reporting requirements, fine-tune definitions, and extend the authorities herein
another five years, to 2006 (Public Law 107-24; approved August 3, 2001).
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sec. 708 of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-280; 114 Stat. 862; 22
U.S.C. 2797b note; approved October 6, 2000), which requires the President to certify that
Russian persons he identifies as “a party to an agreement related to commercial cooperation
on MTCR equipment or technology with a United States person” is not also one who
transfers goods, services, or technology to Iran, as identified pursuant to sec. 2(a)(1)(B) of
this Act.
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 199228
Section 1604 (Sanctions Against Certain Persons) requires the President to
impose sanctions against any person whom he has determined to be engaged in
transferring goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and materially to the
efforts by Iran or Iraq to acquire chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.  Section 1605 (Sanctions
Against Certain Foreign Countries) similarly addresses activities of foreign
governments.  
In both cases, mandatory sanctions prohibit, for a period of two years, the U.S.
government from entering into procurement agreements with, or issuing licenses for
exporting to or for the sanctioned person or country.  Where a foreign country is
found to be in violation of the law, the President must suspend U.S. assistance;
instruct U.S. Executive Directors in the international financial institutions to oppose
multilateral development bank assistance; suspend codevelopment and coproduction
projects the U.S. government might have with the offending country for one year;
suspend, also for one year, most technical exchange agreements involving military
and dual-use technology; and prohibit the exportation of U.S. Munitions List items
for one year.  In the case of foreign countries targeted for sanctions under this Act,
the President may, at his discretion, use authority granted him under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act to further prohibit transactions with the country.
The President may waive the mandatory sanctions against persons or foreign
country with 15 days notice to congressional committees that exercising such a
waiver is essential to U.S. national interests.
Section 1603 (Application to Iran of Certain Iraq Sanctions) makes
sanctions in section 586G(a)(1) through (4) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1990 also
fully applicable against Iraq (see below).
Enacted as title XVI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993 (Public Law  102-484; approved October 23, 1992).  Sec. 1408(a) of Public
Law  104-106 (110 Stat. 494) amended sections 1604 and 1605 to apply not just to
conventional weapons but also to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 200029
Sections 2 through 5 (Reports; Application; Procedures; Determination;
50 U.S.C. 1701 note) require the President to report to Congress twice a year to
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current text.
identify “every foreign person with respect to whom there is credible information
indicating that that person, on or after January 1, 1999, transferred to Iran...” goods,
services or technology the export of which (1) is controlled for nonproliferation
reasons in accordance with various international agreements, or (2) is not controlled
by the country of origin but would be subject to controls if shipped from the United
States.  The President is authorized to apply a range of sanctions against any foreign
person included in his report, including denial of procurement contracts with the U.S.
government, prohibition on importation into the United States, and denial of foreign
assistance – sanctions laid out in Executive Order 12938, as amended.30 A foreign
person named in the President’s report may also be denied U.S. government sales of
items on the U.S. Munitions List and export licenses for dual-use items.
The decision to impose sanctions is left to the President, but he is required to
notify Congress of his reasons to take no action.  The President may also take no
action if he finds that (1) the person in question did not “knowingly transfer”
objectionable items to Iran; (2) the goods, services or technology “did not materially
contribute to Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or
ballistic or cruise missile systems; (3) the named person falls under the jurisdiction
of a government that is an adherent to “one or more relevant nonproliferation
regimes” and his actions were consistent with such regime’s guidelines; or (4) the
government of jurisdiction “has imposed meaningful penalties” on the named person.
Section 6 (Restrictions on Extraordinary Payments in Connection with the
International Space Station) prohibits any agency of the U.S. government from
making extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or any
affiliates, or the Government of the Russian Federation, or any entities of the
government, until the President determines and reports to Congress that: (1) it is the
Russian government’s policy “to oppose the proliferation to Iran of weapons of mass
destruction and missile systems capable of delivering such weapons;” (2) the Russian
government has demonstrated a commitment to preventing transfers of such goods
to Iran; and (3) the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or its affiliates, has not
made such transfers to Iran in the preceding year (other than those allowed by the
President’s certification for exemptions).
The President may allow extraordinary payments when “such payments are
necessary to prevent the imminent loss of life by or grievous injury to individuals
aboard the International Space Station.”  This allowance requires the President to
notify to Congress such payments will be allowed, and to report to Congress on
details within 30 days of the initial notification.  The President may also allow
extraordinary payments for specific development programs of the International Space
Station provided he notify Congress ahead of payment and that the recipients of that
payment are not subject to nonproliferation sanctions.
Public Law 106-178; approved March 14, 2000.  It has not been amended.
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Iraq Sanctions Act of 199031
This Act reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to sanctions leveled by the
United Nations after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990.  The findings, laid out in
section 586F (Declarations Regarding Iraq’s Long-Standing Violations of
International Law), cite Iraq’s violation of international law relating to chemical
and biological warfare, Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran and its own
Kurdish population, efforts to expand its chemical weapons capabilities, evidence of
biological weapons development, and its efforts to establish a nuclear arsenal.
Section 586C (Trade Embargo Against Iraq) continues sanctions imposed
pursuant to four  executive orders issued at the outset of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Sanctions include foreign assistance, trade, economic restrictions, and the freezing
of Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction.  The President may alter or terminate the
sanctions issued in his executive orders only with prior 15-day notification to
Congress.
Section 586D (Compliance with U.N. Sanctions Against Iraq) prohibits
foreign assistance, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) funding, and
assistance or sales under the AECA to countries found to be not in compliance with
United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iraq.  The President may waive
these sanctions if he determines and certifies to Congress that assistance is in U.S.
national interest, that assistance will benefit the targeted country’s needy, or such
assistance will be in the form of humanitarian assistance for foreign nationals fleeing
Iraq and Kuwait.
Section 586G (Sanctions Against Iraq) prohibits the United States from
engaging in the following activities relating to Iraq: (1) U.S. foreign military sales
under the AECA; (2) commercial arms sales licensing of items on the U.S. Munitions
List; (3) exports of control list goods and technology, as defined by secs. 4(b) and
5(c)(1) of the Export Administration Act; (4) issuance of licenses or other
authorizations relating to nuclear equipment, materials, and technology; (5)
international financial institutions support; (6) Export-Import Bank funding;
(7)Commodity Credit Corporation funding; and (8) foreign assistance other than
emergency medical or humanitarian funding.
Pursuant to section 586H (Waiver Authority), the President may waive the
application of sec. 586G sanctions if he certifies to Congress that the Government of
Iraq has demonstrated improved respect for human rights, does not support
international terrorists, and “is not acquiring, developing, or manufacturing (i)
ballistic missiles, (ii) chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or (iii) components
for such weapons; has forsworn the first use of such weapons; and is taking
substantial and verifiable steps to destroy or otherwise dispose of any such missiles
and weapons it possesses...”  The President must further certify that Iraq is meeting
its obligations under several international agreements.  Finally, the President must
certify that it is in the national interest of the United States to make such a waiver and
resume any or all of these economic supports.  The section also authorizes the
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President to waive the restrictions in response to a fundamental change in Iraq’s
leadership, provided the new government makes credible assurances that it meets the
above criteria.
Section 586I (Denial of Licenses for Certain Exports to Countries Assisting
Iraq’s Rocket or Chemical, Biological, or Nuclear Weapons Capability) prohibits
the export licensing of supercomputers to any government (or its officials) that the
President finds to be assisting Iraq in improving its rocket technology, or chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons capability.  While the section includes no waiver
authority, it is triggered by the President making a determination and so its
implementation rests with the executive branch.
Enacted as secs. 586-586J of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (Public Law  101-513; approved
November 5, 1990).  It has not been amended.
National Emergencies Act32
Title II (50 U.S.C. 1621, 1622) authorizes the President to declare, administer,
and terminate national emergencies.  Such a condition is required for the President
to exercise his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Public Law  94-412; approved September 14, 1976.  There have been no
substantive amendments relevant to proliferation issues.
North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 199933
The North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 prohibits the entering into effect
for the United States of any international agreement or agreement for cooperation
with North Korea that would result in North Korea obtaining nuclear materials.  The
law also prohibits U.S. issuance of export licenses for, or approval for transfer or
retransfer of,  nuclear materials, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or
technology that would be subject to such an agreement.  To make such materials
available, the President must determine and report to Congress that North Korea has
met certain benchmarks on the safe use of nuclear materials, including: cooperation
with the IAEA on inspections, compliance with IAEA safeguard agreements,
compliance with terms of the Agreed Framework it reached with the United States,
implementation of terms of the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization, no accrual of
enriched uranium or the means to develop that material, and no efforts to acquire or
develop nuclear weapon capability.  The President must also determine and certify
that it is the U.S. national interest to transfer key nuclear components to North Korea.
Enacted as subtitle B of title VIII of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001
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(H.R.3427, enacted by reference in sec. 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113; 113 Stat.
1501A-472; approved November 29, 1999).
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 197834
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 states U.S. policy for actively
pursuing more effective international controls over the transfer and use of nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes in order to prevent
proliferation.  The policy statement includes the establishment of common
international sanctions.  The Act promotes the establishment of a framework for
international cooperation for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, authorizes
the U.S. government to license exports of nuclear fuel and reactors to countries that
adhere to nuclear non-proliferation policies, provides incentives for countries to
establish joint international cooperative efforts in nuclear non-proliferation, and
authorizes relevant export controls.  The Act requires the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to publish regulations establishing procedures for granting, suspending,
revoking or amending nuclear export licenses.  The Act also requires the Department
of Commerce to issue regulations relating to all export items that could be of
significance for nuclear explosive purposes.
Section 304(b) (Export Licensing Procedures; 42 U.S.C. 2155a) requires the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to publish regulations establishing the procedures
for granting, suspending, revoking or amending nuclear export licenses.  Section 309
(42 U.S.C. 2139a) similarly requires the Department of Commerce to issue
regulations relating to all export items that could be of significance for nuclear
explosive purposes.
Section 402 (Additional Requirements; 42 U.S.C. 2153a) provides that,
unless otherwise stated in a cooperation agreement, no source or special nuclear
material exported from the United States may be enriched after exportation unless the
United States approves the enrichment.  The section prohibits the export of nuclear
material for the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling if the recipient country is
party to a cooperation agreement with the United States amended or concluded after
1978, unless the agreement specifically allows for such transfers.  Finally, the section
prohibits export of any major critical component of any uranium enrichment, nuclear
fuel reprocessing, or heavy water production facility, unless a cooperation agreement
specifically designates these items as exportable.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 was enacted as Public Law  95-242;
approved March 10, 1978.  Secs. 304(b) and 402 have not been amended.  Minor
changes have been incorporated into sec. 309, relating to a requirement of prior
consultation and the reorganization of the Department of State.
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Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 199435
The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 was enacted to update current
law to reflect growing concerns about nuclear proliferation.
Section 821 (Imposition of Procurement Sanction on Persons Engaging in
Export Activities That Contribute to Proliferation; 22 U.S.C. 3201 note) requires
U.S. government procurement sanctions against any U.S. person or foreign person
if the President determines that person has materially, and with requisite knowledge,
contributed, through export of goods or technology, to efforts to acquire
unsafeguarded special nuclear material, or to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or
otherwise acquire a nuclear explosive device.  Terms of the sanctions are that the
U.S. government may not, for 12 months, procure from or enter into procurement
contracts with the sanctioned individual.  Sanctions may be terminated after 12
months if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the individual has
stopped whatever activities that brought on the sanctions, and that the individual will
not engage in such activities in the future.  Otherwise, to waive the sanctions at the
end of 12 months, the President must determine and certify to Congress, 20 days in
advance, that continuing the sanctions would have a serious adverse effect on vital
U.S. interests.
The President is not required to apply or maintain sanctions if the articles or
services provided are essential to U.S. national security; if the provider is a sole
source; if the articles or services is essential to national security under defense
cooperative agreements; if the articles are essential spare parts, essential component
parts, routine servicing or maintenance, or information and technology essential to
U.S. production.  Sanctions may also not be required if the individual relied on an
advisory opinion of the State Department stating that a particular activity was not
deemed to be sanctionable.
In the case of a foreign person, the President is required to enter into
consultation with the foreign government with primary jurisdiction over that person,
and thus may delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 90 days.  Sanctions may be
further averted if the President determines and certifies that the foreign government
has taken steps to end the foreign person’s activities.
Section 823 (Role of International Financial Institutions; 22 U.S.C. 3201
note) requires the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct U.S. executive directors of
international financial institutions to use voice and vote to oppose promotion of the
acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or the development,
stockpiling, or use of nuclear explosive devices by any non-nuclear-weapon state.
Section 824 (Prohibition on Assisting Nuclear Proliferation Through the
Provision of Financing; 22 U.S.C. 3201 note) prohibits financial institutions and
persons involved with financial institutions from assisting nuclear proliferation
through the provision of financing.  The section requires that when the President
determines that a U.S. person or foreign person has engaged in a prohibited activity,
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he shall impose the following sanctions: (1) ban on dealing in U.S. government debt
instruments; (2) ban on serving as a depositary for U.S. government funds; (3) ban
on pursuing, directly or indirectly, new commerce in the United States; and (4) ban
on conducting business from a new location in the United States.
The President is required to consult with any foreign government that serves as
primary jurisdiction for any foreign person sanctioned under this section.  Sanctions
may be delayed for 90 days while consultation with a foreign government is
underway, and may be further averted if the foreign government takes steps to stop
the prohibited activity.
Sanctions are in place for not less than 12 months, and are terminated then only
if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the person’s engagement in
prohibited activity has ceased and will not resume.  The President may waive the
continued use of sanctions when he determines and certifies to Congress that
continuing the restrictions would have a serious adverse effect on the safety and
soundness of the domestic or international financial system or the domestic or
international payments system.
The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 was enacted as title VIII of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law
103-236; approved April 30, 1994).  Sec. 157(b) of Public Law  104-164 (approved
July 21, 1996) made changes to sec. 824, including striking out a requirement that
any Presidential determination pursuant to subsec. (c) be reviewed by the courts.
